Deputy to the Polish Sejm from 1927 to 1935 and ambassador to the Soviet Union from July 1936 to 17 September 1939.
"Pravda" publishes an introductory article on the causes of Poland's military defeat, which it ties not only to the advantage of German technology and the lack of effective assistance from Western countries, but to errors of Polish minority policy. Minorities in Poland are deprived of all rights, treated as colonies and therefore there is no internal consolidation in Poland, without which there is no military strength. The article looks like it lays the groundwork for a potential decision. Tass issued an official announcement about the violation of the Soviet border on 12th inst. Four of our aircraft landed on Soviet territory".
The local press reports news, allegedly from Berlin, about an uprising in Eastern Małopolska and unrest among Belarusians seeking to create an independent republic. I attach some importance to this information because it was disseminated to reservists in Moscow a few days ago.
The partial mobilisation carried out so far by the Soviets has disturbed the economic and transport apparatus and caused some panic among the population. It seems to be the starting point for a larger political game on the part of the Soviets. According to neutral sources, the mobilisation caused surprise and disorientation at the German embassy. The English ambassador was instructed to investigate the possibility of delivering aircraft and machine guns to us through a Czech MP. The ambassador is skeptical about the possibility and will inform me of the result.
In 1939, a trade agreement was signed between the USSR and Poland, to which the Soviet side is determined to adhere precisely. With regard to deliveries from the USSR to Poland of military supplies, and also transit through the USSR from other countries, then it is unlikely in the current international situation, when Germany, Poland, Britain and France are already at war, and the Soviet Union does not want to be dragged into that war, not on one side nor the other, and must, in turn, take measures to supply itself with necessary military supplies and in general provide for its own external security.
Regarding the reaction of the Soviet press to the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The dinner took place in the appointed hour, but in an atmosphere of great nervousness and tension, because during this time Ribbentrop talked on the phone with Berlin several times, which would indicate that negotiations with Stalin did not go completely on the predicted line in Berlin and that Ribbentrop he asked for additional instructions. See more
This mood of nervousness of the German embassy, as well as difficulties in the last stage of the negotiations, were not wished to be shown to the Italian Ambassador to Italy. All this taken together in my opinion indicates that the non-aggression pact concluded on August 23 has limited political significance and that it was inspired by tactical reasons on both sides. An element confirming this thesis is also the interview of Marshal Voroshilov of August 27, as well as the manner of interpretation of this pact by Molotov in talks with the French and English ambassador.
According to local diplomatic circles, the Non-aggression pact is a big success for the Soviets. It can guarantee them a free hand in the early stages of a conflict. However, no one believes the Soviets will engage in a deeper collaboration with the Germans. Military missions stay in Moscow for now, the date of their departure has not been set yet.
Today’s press comments do not shed enough light on the Soviet motivation for the pact.
The Chinese Charge d’affaires reported that the Chinese view of the pact is negative, because it diminishes the possibility of assistance from Great Britain, and China can’t count on any help from the Soviets.