Upon the Invasion of Poland in September 1939 he lobbied the French government to fulfil their obligations within the Franco-Polish Alliance.
Bonnet informed me: Voroshilov asserted that further negotiations regarding the Berlin agreement are pointless thereby putting all responsibility on us for our refusal to let the Soviet troops pass. Molotov told the French ambassador the same, stating we showed disdain towards Soviet help offered, and by refusing it we are completely responsible for breaking the arrangement and therefore for the Soviet-German pact. See more
The issue of the Baltic States is out-dated, as there is no threat of German aggression. He pointed that our non-aggression pact with the Germans was a precedent for the Soviet-German pact. Asked about Danzig he said Russia would follow France and England. Questioned about secret clauses he refused to answer stating he did not ask about secret clauses in the French arrangements. The matter of the recent mutual help agreement with Turkey will be considered by the Soviet government taking the new situation into account.
Minister Bonnet requested to see me so he could inform me about the démarche that he had to undertake today regarding Ambassador Noël and General Musse.
In military negotiations with France and England, the Soviet government demanded that Soviet troops be allowed to enter Polish and Romanian territory in the event of a war. With regards to us, the Soviets would like to obtain permission for their troops to enter Eastern Małopolska and the Vilnius “corridor”. See more
Emphasizing the strictly secret nature of this message, Bonnet asked me to inform the Minister that it matters very much to him that the prime minister and he agree with Moscow, and that both hope that we would consider accepting the Soviet proposal, keeping in mind the strictly secret nature of a possible military agreement.
Since Bonnet was only passing on the information to me, I told him that I would discuss everything with the Minister and I avoided discussing the details, which B. wanted.
It is difficult for me to imagine that Bonnet would have any doubts regarding our answer, but I rather think that this is either about blaming us for disrupting the negotiations with Moscow, or the French and British hope that the Soviet government will not insist on matters concerning us and Romania, and that an agreement will be possible at the expense of the Baltic states.
I carried out my instructions by communicating the information given to me to Ambassador Léger. I took advantage of his visit to bring up our reservations regarding the Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty and protocol like I had done with Bonnet before. Léger reacted positively to my points, said that it was never the intention of the French government to handle issues that could affect us as in the Baltic states' case. He stressed that the issue of indirect aggression, particularly, does not concern us, or Romania, Turkey and Greece, he thanked me for drawing attention to this issue and told me that he would deal with it immediately.