Foreign minister of France since 1938. He was a staunch supporter of the Munich Agreement and of the policy of appeasement.
Minister Bonnet requested to see me so he could inform me about the démarche that he had to undertake today regarding Ambassador Noël and General Musse.
In military negotiations with France and England, the Soviet government demanded that Soviet troops be allowed to enter Polish and Romanian territory in the event of a war. With regards to us, the Soviets would like to obtain permission for their troops to enter Eastern Małopolska and the Vilnius “corridor”. See more
Emphasizing the strictly secret nature of this message, Bonnet asked me to inform the Minister that it matters very much to him that the prime minister and he agree with Moscow, and that both hope that we would consider accepting the Soviet proposal, keeping in mind the strictly secret nature of a possible military agreement.
Since Bonnet was only passing on the information to me, I told him that I would discuss everything with the Minister and I avoided discussing the details, which B. wanted.
It is difficult for me to imagine that Bonnet would have any doubts regarding our answer, but I rather think that this is either about blaming us for disrupting the negotiations with Moscow, or the French and British hope that the Soviet government will not insist on matters concerning us and Romania, and that an agreement will be possible at the expense of the Baltic states.